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In ‘Digital Disaster, Cyber Security, and the Copenhagen School,’ published in 2009, Lene 
Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum suggest ways in which securitization theory can help us 
understand the politics of cybersecurity and cyberwar, a complex terrain that brings together 
a variety of technical and policy challenges that range from individual cybersecurity 
problems (cybercrime) through to issues of national and economic cybersecurity (anxieties 
about attacks on ‘critical infrastructure’) (Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009). Some of the 
threats point to futuristic ‘black swan’ disasters that result from our high-speed networked 
society; some of the challenges are traditional problems – abuse and harassment, grooming 
and  recruitment, identity theft and fraud – carried out with new technologies. The cyber-
terrain is one where there is an anxiety that an individual can become a national security 
problem in new and dangerous ways – and where cyber techniques and technologies of 
national security can play out at the level of the individual in new and unprecedented ways, 
with innovations in the surveillance and monitoring of everyday life: the security state 
becomes  - to use the fashionable management term - increasingly granular. This essay 
returns to Hansen and Nissenbaum’s article, an article that introduced new complexities, 
questions and nuances to the study of cybersecurity in security studies and international 
relations, to think about the changing terrain of cybersecurity in the second decade of the 
Twenty First Century– and the importance (and problems) of thinking about the ‘non-West’ 
in research on (cyber)securitization. 
 
Hansen and Nissenbaum are interested in how the collective ‘referent objects’ of ‘the state,’ 
‘society,’ ‘the nation’ and ‘the economy’ are presented as being threatened through three 
types of securitization that ‘tie referent objects and securitizing actors together’(Ibid, p.1163): 
hypersecuritization, everyday security practices and technifications.  On this view, 
hypersecuritzation refers to the expansion of a security problem into a realm where there is 
the danger that threats can be exaggerated, resulting in excessive countermeasures: these 
hypersecuritizations, according to Hansen and Nissenbaum, always ‘mobilize the spectre of 
the future’ while also using ‘the past as a legitmating reference’(Ibid, p.1164). In the public 
threat horizon of future threats and dangers, proponents of cyber fears often use historical 
analogies of ‘electronic pearl habors’ or ‘cyber 9/11s’ in speculations on new types of threats: 
for the securitization theorists, the ‘re-animation’ of past events works to give a ‘form’ or 




What was significant about Hansen and Nissenbaum’s essay was the way it attempted to add 
new approaches and questions to a topic that tended to occupy a space in an often highly 
technical discourse of security, technology and strategy, a discourse that extended in to all 
aspects of life in a digitizing society. Indeed, ‘everyday security practices’ in their work 
refers to the ways that individuals and organizations are integrated into the practices of 
securitization as ‘both a responsible partner in fighting insecurity’ and also as a potential 
threat, allowing for responses that can permeate all aspects of everyday life (Ibid, p.1165). 
This was a discourse of security that due to the technical complexity was presented as 
occupying the ‘cutting edges’ of security, a zone that few outside of computer science would 
be able to engage with. In this sense, ‘technification’ refers to the manner in which 
cybersecurity becomes a terrain that depends on the ‘expert authority’ of the computer 
scientist and policy expert for its legitimacy, a domain where ‘the experts’ are the securitizing 
actors in a manner that risks to detach the issues from critical scrutiny and dialogue. Using 
the case study of Estonia in April-May in 2007 the authors illustrate how securitization theory 
can bring conceptual clarity and complexity to a terrain that can either be reduced to 
simplifications using the past as a means of understanding – or taking the issues into a zone 
where it is beyond our means of critical understanding and comprehension, where we feel 
overpowered by our inability to engage critically with the issues, issues that can leave us with 
the feeling we are in the realm of geopolitical science fictions, a world that feels increasingly 
like the ‘cyberpunk’ novels of William Gibson or films such as Ghost in the Shell. 
 
Hansen and Nissenbaum reach a conclusion that resonates with the broader objectives of 
securitization theory and ‘critical security studies’: to develop strategies to counter and 
interrogate the ‘exceptional’ status of security issues – where an issue might be presented as 
‘exceptional’ due to the threat to the national interest and/or exceptional due to the technical 
knowledge needed to evaluate the threat: 
 
Cyber securitizations are particularly powerful precisely because they involve a double 
move out of the political realm: from the politicized to the securitized, from the 
political to the technified, and it takes an inter-disciplinary effort to assess the 
implications of the move, and possibly to counter it…cyber security stands at the 
intersection of multiple disciplines and it is important that both analysis and academic 
communication is brought to bear on it. The technical underpinnings of cyber security 
require, for instance, that IR scholars acquire some familiarity with the main technical 
methods and dilemmas, and vice versa that computer scientists become more cognizant 
of the politicized field in which they design and how their decisions might impact the 
(discursively constituted) trade-offs between security, access, trust, and privacy (Ibid, p. 
1172). 
   
The implication of this argument is an important one: we should develop the tools that enable 
us to challenge the ethico-political dangers of hypersecuritization in this rapidly changing 
(cyber) space; to be able to see into this zone of expert knowledge and authority, the spaces 
where decisions are made on the policies and technologies that will shape all areas of war and 
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security (see Balzacq, 2011). But this essay asks: what should IR scholars be doing in 
addition to the challenge and task – to become more inter-disciplinary in order to be able to 
engage with the potential technification and hypersecuritizations of cybersecurity policy and 
discourse – that was set out in Hansen and Nissenbaum’s article? 
 
What we want to do in this essay is suggest that in the time since the essay was published 
there may be problems and trends that have emerged that require some additional approaches 
to this issue of hypersecuritization and technification. Simply put, we need to think again 
about the problems of cybersecurity in the ‘political realm’ and we need to develop research 
on cybersecurity and ‘political realms’ in different places around the planet; to go beyond the 
often hypersecuritizing images of digital danger and ‘otherness’ emerging from the ‘non-
West’ to explore the complexity of cybersecurity both from the perspective of new ‘everyday 
security strategies’ that individuals may confront but also in terms of the potential for ‘digital 
disasters’ that might emerge from specific technological, legal, political and security 
contexts. 
 
Following on from Hansen and Nissenbaum, our position in the paper begins from the view 
that inter-disciplinary attempts to engage critically with hypersecuritization is the primary 
task of work in this space: to be able to counter hypersecuritizations where threats are ‘hyped 
up’ - or unspecified future cyber dangers are invoked - is the first move for scholars who 
want to think critically about the ‘threat horizons’ that we are presented with on the (not so) 
clear and present/future dangers. In the time since the essay has been published (2009) much 
of the debate has centred around the hyper securitization of the concern with all things digital 
and the implications for the future of security and war (most notably in Thomas Rid’s book 
Cyberwar Will Not Take Place). At the same time, there have also been events that have 
pointed to the possibility of the types of future problems that we could confront – from events 
that fit with the type of warnings on digital disaster that many have been making since the 
issue emerged (the hacking of Ukrainian power grids, the Central Bank of Bangladesh bank 
heist) to the emergence of events that were not considered in previous speculations on digital 
disaster (Zetter, 2016a; Zetter, 2016b) : attempts to shape the political direction of other states 
through a combination of disruptive ‘gray zone’ tactics that may involve hacking and new 
uses of social media (the debate over ‘fake news’ and social media, the U.S. Presidential 
election in 2016). The problem now is not simply hypersecuritization but the problem of what 
Ulrich Beck describes as ‘organized irresponsibility’ where the ‘state administration, politics, 
industrial management and research negotiate the criteria of what is ‘rational and safe.’’ 
Discussing environmental risks, Beck asks ‘do we live in the context of ‘organized 
irresponsibility’?’(Beck, 1999, p.6). We would suggest the same question needs to be asked 
in the context of the securitization of digital risks and insecurities. 
 
What we suggest in the article is this: once we have established that the first move in this area 
is think critically about cyber securitizations and the potential problems of the move from the 
political to the technified, we can consider the concerns of those who we describe as the 
‘cyber catastrophists’ – those who continue to be concerned about the digital disasters that 
could impact on all aspects of life. We suggest that in this realm of cybersecurity we see three 
5 
 
positions that shape the ideas that are contributing to vibrant debate and discussion of the 
future of cyberwar and cybersecurity: the cyber catastrophist, the digital realist and the techno 
optimist. The essay rests on the position that each perspective presents us with questions 
about cybersecuritizations that we need to constantly remain open to – given the fast-moving 
and disruptive pace of geopolitical and technological change. We suggest that the point in 
Hansen and Nissenbaum’s essay about the need to counter hypersecuritizations needs to be 
supplemented by more exploratory questions about whether we confront the issue of 
organized irresponsibility in this space. The problem of technification is not simply on how it 
might add legitimacy to hypersecuritization, in what it enables us to visualize in the 
imagination of digital disaster – it is what it fails to see or ignores, the construction and 
legitimation of what is rational and safe. In other words, we need to examine the politics – 
and the different positions that may shape policy – in the spaces where important ‘expert’ 
decisions are made: to examine, for example, how risk and unintended consequence are being 
integrated into planning. But the questions opened up by the ‘deconstruction’ of 
cybersecurity and cyberwar by Hansen and Nissenbaum also point to inquiry on the changing 
nature of ‘everyday security practices’ and here we suggest that is clearer now is the need for 
IR scholars to examine the specific contexts, controversies and challenges in diverse spaces 
beyond the often simplistic geographies of cyber-threat that often serve to fuel the 
hypersecuritized visions of geopolitical imaginaries.  
 
One of the geopolitical anxieities that circulates in many of the key positions we discuss is a 
concern with the cyber insecurities that we confront from the non-West or that may result 
from poor cyber governance in the non-West. While this use of the term ‘non-West’ can be 
problematic and limiting it does remind us to think beyond the simplistic geography of 
‘cyber’ danger that is often central to the debates about cybersecurity, the geopolitical 
imaginary filled with devious Bond- villains from former Communist-countries, cunning-
‘Oriental’ cyber criminals from a cyberpunk movie, totalitarian states experimenting with 
new technologies of Minority Report-like control and  ‘feral’ digital environments in states 
outside the ‘tame zones’ of global politics. Securitization perspectives – along with work 
influenced by poststructuralist writers – are often a call to see beyond the simplistic 
representations of global politics that continue to imagine the future through the same 
geographies of otherness and difference that shaped the past (Hansen, 2006). This article 
suggests that – in the spirit of Hansen and Nissenbaum’s essay – we need to keep searching 
for the questions that need to be asked about a terrain that more than ever needs to be 
examined in its fast moving complexity and messiness: to examine the difference, complexity 
and messiness of new trends, practices and behaviours in environments that are often ignored 





The Cyber Catastrophist, the Digital Realist, and the Techno Optimist  
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The Cyber Catastrophist  
The cyber catastrophist suggests that digital disaster is on the threat horizon – and it is often 
underplayed in the discourses of geopolitical danger.  Few catastrophists, however, would see 
digital disasters resulting in social, economic and infrastructural collapse similar to the 
violence made possible by weapons of mass destruction. But there are exceptions. In  Global 
Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds - the fifth instalment of the National Intelligence Councils 
reports on the future of global security and economy - the report includes a list of ‘Potential 
Black Swans That Would Cause the Greatest Disruptive Impact’: 
 
Nuclear powers such as Russia and Pakistan and potential aspirants such as Iran and 
North Korea see nuclear weapons as compensation for other political and security 
weaknesses, heightening the risk of their use. The chance of nonstate actors conducting 
a cyber attack – or using WMD – also is increasing.(National Intelligence Council, 
2012, p.xi) 
 
What is interesting here– in a measured report not prone to doom-mongering or panic – is the 
partnering of cyber with the more traditional threat of nuclear attack and weapons of mass 
destruction. Although the exact nature of the consequences are left vague and unspecified, 
what is interesting for us is this move to frame cybersecurity or cyber-weapons on the same 
level as weapons of mass destruction, a potentially hyper-securitizing move that includes 
non-state actors as potential contributors to digital disaster. 
This anxiety about the potential capabilities of ‘non-traditional’ actors with ‘non-traditional’ 
weapons circulates in many speculations on future insecurity. The United States’ Third Offset 
Strategy sets out to explore the cutting edge of technology, to try to ‘stay ahead’ of the enemy 
in a terrain where non-state actors might become a threat in a traditional sense and where 
state actors might become a threat in a non-traditional sense, operating in the ‘gray zone,’ 
using the evolving tactics of ‘ambiguous war.’ In the Third Offset Strategy the ‘pace of 
change’ is seen as a fundamental element in the security landscape. As Undersecretary for 
Defence Bob Work says in a speech on the strategy: 
 
Unlike the previous offsets, the fielding of tactical nuclear weapons and precision-
guided bombs and missiles, which deterred war and gave the American military in 
some cases four decades of advantages over adversaries, this new technology probably 
won’t provide an edge that long.(Work, 2015) 
 
The anxiety is that all the ‘traditional’ hierarchies – the order that ‘international society’ 
upheld - is disrupted by the pace of change, a pace of change that provides dangerous 
opportunities for non-state actors and ‘peer competitors.’ According to Work, the potential to 
lose the competitive edge in technology stems from vulnerabilities in cyberspace: ‘What's 
more, some of the potential competitors are letting us do the research and development, then 
they steal it from us through cyber theft and they go right to development, rather than 
spending their own resources on Research and Development (R&D)’(Ibid).  On this view, the 
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cyber threat becomes a danger through the way it impacts on traditional elements of defense 
and security. 
Great powers/peer competitors play the biggest role in this visions of future insecurity. In 
2013 a small independent ‘b’ movie (film and popular culture can a role in legitimating 
hypersecuritization) was released that depicted a cyberattack orchestrated by China on the 
critical infrastructure on the United States. The cyber attack was a reaction to the failure of 
the U.S. to pay back its debt. The Chinese are able to shut down critical infrastructure and 
invade the U.S: the movie becomes a 21st century version of the 1980s Cold War movie, Red 
Dawn  that depicted young Americans resisting an occupying force from Russia. Dragon Day 
(Directed by Jeffrey Travis, 2014) built this scenario on the fear – a fear that we have seen 
circulate in real world discussions of cybersecurity - that  some products ‘made in china’ may 
contain malware that can be activated to control/shut down the everyday technologies we use 
and the critical infrastructure that we depend upon.  
While the movie might tap into and express broader fears about the rise of China, most 
commentators would see this type of cyberwar scenario as geopolitical science fiction. Most 
cyber catastrophists would agree with Thomas Rid that sabotage, espionage and subversion 
are the primary cyber tactics that states will develop and deploy (Rid, 2013). But where the 
‘extrinsic catastrophist’ – those who argue threat comes from the outside - might differ with 
Rid is on the question of scale and destructiveness of new types of sabotage, espionage and 
subversion. The counter-argument to this catastrophist position is that a state will not launch 
such a cyber-event because they will face the same constraints and deterrents that would 
apply to more traditional weapons. But for the extrinsic catastrophist the issue is that the 
actions of deterritorialized and networked non-state actors won’t be shaped by the same 
anxieties about retaliation and laws of war that will shape the behaviour of states. In addition, 
there might be states that support non-state actors, enabling them to orchestrate the type of 
destructive events that previously only states could orchestrate: states that engage in such 
practices of ‘ambiguous war’ will be playing with fire. But for the extrinsic catastrophist the 
problem is that non-state actors might obtain the capability to act like states. Or even more 
troubling: an individual might obtain the destructive capacity of a state or non-state actor. We 
heard one expert refer to the possibility of the S.I.M.A.D – the single individual massively 
destructive.  
For the cyber catastrophist the state is a realm of organised irresponsibility. For former 
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism, Richard 
Clarke, we have to face the reality of possible cyber 9/11s or Pearl Harbors. For Clarke and 
Knake, we are moving headfirst into a more vulnerable and insecure security environment.  
The speed at which thousands of targets can be hit, almost anywhere in the world, 
brings with it the prospect of highly volatile crises. The force that prevented nuclear 
war, deterrence, does not work well in cyber war. The entire phenomenon of cyber war 
is shrouded in such government secrecy that it makes the Cold War look like a time of 
openness and transparency. The biggest secret in the world about cyber war may be that 
at the very same time the U.S. prepares for offensive cyber war, it is continuing policies 
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that make it impossible to defend the nation effectively from cyber attack.(Clarke and 
Knake, 2010, p.xi)  
At the same time, there are cyber catastrophists outside the realm of national security thinkers 
and experts. The influential French philosophers and social critics Jean Baudrillard and Paul 
Virilio wrote about technology and catastrophe since the 1960s from the perspective of 
‘intrinsic catastrophists’:  Virilio and Baudrillard are both concerned that progress is 
catastrophe in our accelerated times; catastrophe comes from the worlds we build. For Paul 
Virilio, the problem is the possibility of the integral accident (Virilio, 2007) The integral 
accident is the possibility of the accident that is magnified due to the interconnected nature of 
the world we live in: an example might be a financial crisis or the possibility of cascading 
global impacts that result from human-generated climate change. Our complex, 
interconnected world generates the possibility of accidents and disasters that are not confined 
to a locality – the local accident can become global and the impact of the local event can 
extend through time. Virilio suggests we are too seduced by the possibilities of transforming 
society offered by new technologies, the promise of speed, efficiency and networked 
existence. For Virilio, the problem is that we are designing and creating a fragile 
technological infrastructure that will exceed our capacity to control it.  Jean Baudrillard adds 
this suggestion on the future of insecurity: in modernity we view history as a process that 
improves the human condition. But for Baudrillard, the pace of technological change now has 
the capacity to be too disruptive: the pace of change that we are witnessing in technology will 
lead to ‘exponential instability’ (Baudrillard, 1994, p.87). These are problems that reach 
beyond the problem of organized irresponsibility and failures of governance and regulation. 
The cyber catastrophist suggests that while we need to be wary of inflated and unsupported 
threats the primary task here is take seriously the possibility of digital disasters and 
catastrophes – and to assess whether different organizations tasked with securing and 
protecting us are acting responsibly. While the digital disaster scenarios of movies like 
Dragon Day are geopolitical science fictions, we are seeing events that suggest that 
unprecedented cyber catastrophes could take place - but they wouldn’t look like anything we 
can currently imagine in a world of ‘exponential instability.’ The question the catastrophist 
leaves us with: where are the vulnerabilities and what are we failing to see? 
 
The Digital Realist  
For the digital realist of cybersecurity and cyberwar, Dragon Day would be an example of the 
most extreme panic and paranoia in debates about cybersecurity. The digital realist is 
positioned as a counterpoint to the cyber catastrophist, arguing against the ‘hype’ of the 
catastrophist in the hypersecuritization of digital disaster and catastrophe.  Visions of future 
catastrophic events – such as the attacks on transportation networks in London depicted in the 
James Bond film Skyfall (orchestrated by a ‘foreigner’ with a grudge against the UK) - create 
very marketable products in popular culture. There will also be those who benefit 
economically from the political economy of cyber security is created by new threats and 
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insecurities. Indeed, one cybersecurity expert told us about how some organizations, 
businesses and parts of governments were becoming increasingly sceptical about some of the 
catastrophic scenarios that were used in the promotional material for the cyber solutions and 
tools that they wanted to sell. Like Hansen and Nissenbaum, the digital realist sees countering 
hypersecuritization as the primary task in this space; and this countering of 
hypersecuritization has become central to debates on cyberwar and cybersecurity. 
Thomas Rid argues that it is highly problematic to talk about the possibility of cyber war. We 
are unlikely to be involved in conflict where a cyber instrument is the primary ‘weapon.’ War 
is the use of violence to achieve specific political or economic objectives through techniques 
that make the enemy defenceless.  Even if it were possible to fight a war with cyber weapons 
they are unlikely to have the violent capability of more traditional weapons. According to 
Rid, what we are likely to see are cyber instruments used for espionage, sabotage and 
subversion.(see also Valeriano and Maness, 2015). It might be the case that subversion results 
in events the far more extreme than anything we have been used to, where, for example, an 
attempt is made by an external actor to shape the election campaign of another state.  But we 
will become more prepared to counter such threats. 
The realist would most likely support this point in the Global Agenda 2030 report on the 
‘game-changing’ potential of cyber as a weapon of war: 
The degree to which cyber instruments will shape the future of warfare is unclear, 
however. Historians of war believe cyberpower may end up somewhat akin to early 20th 
century projections of the decisiveness of air power. Although air power played a 
significant role in 20th-century conflicts, it never achieved what its most ardent 
enthusiasts claimed it would: an independent war-winning capability(National 
Intelligence Council, 2012, p.67). 
But all this is not to say that cyber techniques of conflict, crime and disruption are not 
destructive to the national interest. But when we talk about the impact on the national interest 
and security, the consequences are generally not physical death and destruction. The key 
challenge for the military will be how to benefit from digitization in terms of speed, safety, 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness while not creating new types of vulnerability. But, at root, 
cyber is just another in a long list of problems that society confronts and much of the impact- 
the reason for it being a security threat – is the economic impact. In Securing Britain in an 
Age of Uncertainty  the data to support the argument that cyber had become a threat to 
national security is all economic (The Cabinet Office, 2010). 
All the problems associated with cyber are just nuisances in the lives of citizens, corporations 
and states. But they are nuisances that will often emerge from the territories in the non-West 
where governments are unable to govern – and maybe even encourage – criminal 
organizations able to exploit vulnerabilities in digital economies. A key ‘villain’ in reports of 
various cyber events – from the Sony hack to the Bangladesh Central Bank heist – is often 
North Korea, presented as a state that is so far out of the international system that it can use 
tactics that no one else would, willing to take risks no one else would. This representation of 
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the geopolitics of cybersecurity might provide an ‘easy target’ through which to explain an 
emerging terrain that is far more diplomatically complex than can be revealed in the public 
sphere;  a geopolitical terrain represented with a new generation of cyber ‘villains,’ often 
with ‘oriental’ cyberpunks and hackers depicted causing clever types of digital disruption, 
experts in the new techniques of corporate/military espionage, a trope that we find in cult 
cyberpunk such as Ghost in the Shell through to mainstream movies such as Christopher 
Nolan’s Inception. 
But for the digital realist, cyber is a twenty first century nuisance- and a relatively minor one 
compared to the benefits that digital technologies provide in our lives and economies. Cyber 
will play a role in the security landscape we will be confronted with but we should not 
overstate the cyber element. Our virtual territories of data and intellectual property might be 
under attack but the type of scenario depicted by Dragon Day is not going to happen. Putting 
to one side the issue whether it would be even possible to shut down the United States 
remotely, it is not going to happen for the same reason that great power conflict becomes less 
likely: the threat that traditional weapons of mass destruction will be used. There would have 
to be a severe degradation of the international ‘scene’ for traditional territorial war between 
great powers to return and if the degradation of the terrain reached such a critical point it is 
unlikely that cyberweapons would play a decisive role. 
Of course, one of the arguments in this terrain is that in the coming century non-state actors 
will be empowered in new ways. But, for the digital realist, it is unlikely to get to the point 
where they could do anything significant: critical infrastructures are too resilient (Calvety 
2008, p.139); states will retain the monopoly over violence and weapons of mass destruction 
(and the monopoly of cyber offensive and defensive capability).  Some might argue that the 
cyber weapons that states have deployed – such as Stuxnet – will be developed and used by 
non-state actors. But malware like Stuxnet are expensive to develop and require long term 
planning and research, with a high level of access to information about the infrastructure that 
will be attacked (Singer and Friedman, 2013). Malware like Stuxnet are state of the art 
projects by the most powerful actors in the international system and even if non-state actors 
develop similar projects in coming decades they will have to deal with the fact that there will 
be increased research and development in the protection of systems. Of course, there could be 
well funded research facilities in shadow economies and failed states but there are less 
sophisticated ways of making money or making a political point.  As Myriam Dunn Calvety 
suggests: ‘These doomsday scenarios are quite frightening. But it is good to know that they 
are about as likely to happen as a landing of alien spaceships’ (Calvety, 2011). 
The digital realist would argue that we should continue to focus on the development of 
offensive and defensive cybersecurity and cyberwar strategies. But we need to be careful not 
to equate cyberweapons with ‘game changers’ that will transform the future of war and create 
the possibility for destructive scenarios common in science fiction movies. On this view, 
there will always be technical fixes to secure critical infrastructures; non-state (and non-
West) actors will lack the capability and states – even if they could – would lack the incentive 
to create a cyber-catastrophe that resulted in ‘physical’ violence. 
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We have to recognize that there are limits to what we can do: cyberspace is only partly 
controlled or controllable by governments. For the digital realist, it all comes back to the 
problem of resources. We do not want to over-react in our response to threats with costly 
measures and uncertain benefits, leaving government with less for middle to low impact but 
high probability threats (Calvety, 2008, P.151).  Like Hansen and Nissenbaum, the digital 
realist suggests that we need to counter hypersecuritizations, remaining alert to the possibility 
that the conditions of cyberwar may change – but for now are Twenty First Century 
nuisances with primarily social and economic consequences. The questions the digital realist 
leaves us with are: how can we avoid exaggerating the threat of cyber war – and how (for the 
more ‘strategically’ minded) can we use these new techniques and technologies to ‘improve’ 
performance in our traditional militaries without creating new vulnerabilities? 
 
The Techno Optimist   
Rejecting the pessimism of thinkers like Virilio and Baudrillard, the techno-optimist views 
History as a story of Progress. Improvement in the human condition is primarily driven by the 
emergence of liberal democracy – where despotic power is limited by the will of the people 
and where ‘tribal’ identities are overtaken by more expansive and potentially cosmopolitan 
ones – and by the emergence of new technologies that improve health, communication, 
economy and security. Societies are transformed by changing values, norms and institutions 
that move toward the inclusion of those who would previously been seen as inferior and 
through laws that protect human rights (Pinker 2012). The techno-optimist believes that if 
societies develop the right type of institutions and political culture we can continue the 
process of overcoming the catastrophes and dangers of the human condition. The liberal 
democratic world is not perfect: things go wrong, mistakes are made - but liberal societies 
have mechanisms of critique and reflection that enable learning and improvement. This is 
part of the resilience of liberal democracy.  
Writing about what he terms ‘protopia,’ Kevin Kelly (one of the leading ‘thought leaders’ on 
new technology and the impact on society) suggests that ‘neither dystopia or utopia is our 
destination’: ‘Protopia is a state of becoming, rather than a destination. It is a process. In the 
protopian mode, things are better today than they were yesterday, although only a little better’ 
(Kelly, 2016, p.13). The techno-optimism of this ‘protopia’ rests on the view that: 
The problems of today were caused by yesterday’s technological successes, and the 
technological solutions to today’s problems will cause the problems of tomorrow. The 
circular expansion of both problems and solutions hides a steady accumulation of small 
net benefits over time. Ever since the Enlightenment and the invention of science we’ve 
managed to create a tiny bit more than we’ve destroyed each year (Ibid, p.13). 
Kelly suggests that while there is clearly the potential for catastrophic events emerging from 
new technology, we should recognize that in the ‘protopia’ this ‘circle of new good 
provoking new bad which provokes new good which spawns new bad is just spinning us in 
place, only faster and faster’ (Ibid, p.275). 
12 
 
For the techno-optimist (or protopian) there will be accidents and disasters but they will not 
have the impact of the worst-case scenarios of the hypersecuritizer; and in the ‘protopia’ we 
will build capacity in response to vulnerabilities and dangers; we will reduce the dangers in 
times when the digitization of all aspects of life will exceed anything we can imagine. For the 
techno optimist, what we need to be doing is focusing on research and education; we need, 
for example, to be supporting research that will provide the technical fixes to fight the 
insecurities of the digital age: we need to be training the next generation of cybersecurity 
experts to help secure individuals, corporations, states and the military.  Most cyber 
‘catastrophes’ result from errors or sloppiness that will be easy to rectify: for example, an 
attempt to make fraudulent transfers totalling $951million after cyber criminals hacked 
Bangladesh Bank in 2016 was possible due to the lack of a Firewall (and the bank used 
second hand $10 switches to connect to the SWIFT global payment network) (Quadir, 2016). 
An international legal architecture will emerge to control and shape the behaviour of states 
and non-state actors in cyberspace; we might be experiencing a moment when our technology 
is leading us into unchartered and ambiguous terrain but we will becoming better at making 
sure law and global governance keeps up with the pace of change. 
In terms of cybersecurity and cyberwar, the techno-optimist is enthusiastic about the digital 
age. The risk of cyber catastrophes on the threat horizon will be eradicated by the 
technological solutions produced by artificial intelligence and better ways of spotting 
vulnerabilities, the ‘glitches’ in code that create unintended consequences (Vatamunu, 2016). 
The primary fear is not about future cyberwar or cyber catastrophes but on the way that states 
will use new technology for surveillance and the control of populations. The techno-optimist 
is primarily concerned with the militarization or ‘Balkanization’ of the internet: the techno-
optimist sees the global community that exists on the internet as one of the most important 
and positive aspects of digital culture. But one of the problems for the techno-optimist is how 
liberal, progressive ideas can spread in the territories that cultivate authoritarian political 
structures. The ideal scenario for the techno optimist is for political change to emerge 
peacefully from the ‘bottom-up’: the techno optimist is concerned that – after some initial 
post-Cold War optimism about the future of liberal democracy – we live in a world where 
authoritarian regimes seem to be in good health, balancing dynamic economies with 
authoritarian political cultures. The anxiety here is that the hypersecuritizing obsessions of 
the state turns inwards, using new innovations to monitor and police populations; and in the 
debates on security in the ‘non-West’ there is a concern about the Minority Report-like 
futures that will be possible in a way that is unlikely to materialise in a West anxious about 
privacy and civil liberties (although this could change – and perhaps is already changing – 
driven by hypersecuritized anxieties). 
The possibilities of positive cultural and political change are even weaker if the internet is 
militarized  or Balkanized: the possibility of grassroots communication, education and 
mobilization becomes limited. For example, in July 2014 the Russian Parliament passed a bill 
requiring all technology companies to store the personal data of all their users in the country; 
coming into effect in September 2016, the policy was justified in terms of national security. It 
was the first serious step to assert national control over segments of the web in light of the 
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revelations about the surveillance by the US National Security Agency; Russia’s internet 
regulator had complained about the lack of cooperation from tech companies like Google, 
Facebook and Twitter in blocking content deemed illegal by the state (Hills, 2014). A 
fragmented internet-moves from being a potential space of freedom to a tightly controlled 
‘shopping mall’ developing new and improved techniques to sell ‘stuff’ and monitor 
populations. There will be those who can by-pass these controls. But these numbers will be 
small; the possibility for popular resistance will be limited. For the techno-optimist, the 
global politics of cybersecurity should be focused on protecting the cybersecurity of the 
citizen against a hypersecuritized threat horizon shaped by states and their new everyday 
security practices.  
The digital realist would most likely remain cautious about the faith in new technology to 
transform war into something more humane: the techno-optimist will see positive ‘protopian’ 
developments in the waging of war. On this view, military technology is moving in a 
direction that reduces the risks faced by the soldiers of liberal democracy – and the precision 
of weapons creates less collateral damage on civilians close to the targets. This trend toward 
more humane forms of war will increase and the evolution of malware like Stuxnet will 
create a new generation of digital weapons (Coker, 2001). States will be able to use 
‘information bombs’ that will destroy the technological infrastructure of city or town without 
killing human beings – but forcing change in the behaviour of opponents. Of course, there are 
those (the catastrophists) who argue that we are entering an age where  far from making war 
more humane and controlled  technology is creating a type of war that will be fought be 
machines and artificial intelligence that will have the power to decide who lives and dies. But 
the techno-optimist will reply that liberal democracies will continue to impose limits on what 
is permissible. Our culture of human rights means that there is a great deal that is possible in 
terms of military technology that simply will not be realized – at least by liberal democracies 
(what China and other states build is another matter) - and we will always place legal 
constraints on what is permissible in war. The trend in military technology is not toward 
automated killing machines  but toward smart cyber weapons that enable destruction without 
destruction, ‘novel munitions,’ non-lethal weapons and incapacitators that will create 
‘bloodless’ war. 
For the techno-realist, the task is to counter – in particular – the securitization of everyday 
life, the invocation of threats – domestic or foreign – to justify new measures to regulate 
people’s digital lives and to justify the introduction of new tactics and technologies to 
regulate all aspects of everyday life. This is, in many ways, the concern Hansen and 
Nissenbaum articulate on how computer scientists might become ‘more cognizant of the 
politicized field in which they design and how their decisions might impact the (discursively 
constituted) trade-offs between security, access, trust, and privacy.’ The question the techno-
optimist leaves is with is – how do we resist attempts to limit the freedom of our digital lives 
and where are the innovations that will transform conflict in the coming century? 




Since the publication of the essay by Hansen and Nissenbaum in 2009 attempts to counter the 
hypersecuritzation of cybersecurity and cyberwar have intensified – from a variety of 
perspectives and theoretical backgrounds (the most notable being Thomas Rids Cyberwar 
Will Not Take Place and Rid’s debate with John Arquilla) (Arquilla, 2012). What we outline 
in this paper are what we see as the three key positions on cybersecurity and cyberwar that 
are currently central to the debates circulating in this emerging terrain: the cyber-
catastrophist, the digital realist and the techno-optimist. Here we are trying to go beyond the 
framing of the cyber debate in terms of cyberwar will take place (and it might be as 
destructive as traditional war) and cyberwar will not happen (it will involve new tools for 
older techniques of statecraft). We are suggesting that while the debates that have been 
waged on the changing character of cyberwar have been vital in clarifying the issues at stake 
we need to remain open to the possibilities revealed in each position. This openness needs to 
be maintained exactly because of the – to use some U.S. military jargon - VUCA (Volatile, 
uncertain, complex, ambiguous) nature of things at this point in time: the extremes of these 
positions might veer into geopolitical science fiction but the questions each position poses are 
important ones and questions that will grow in significance exactly because of the pace of 
geopolitical and technological change; we need to move between them, constantly re-
examining the key questions and assumptions as the ‘terrain’ changes (and as new questions 
and positions undoubtedly emerge).  
 
In particular, we are suggesting that – while the point that Hansen and Nissenbaum conclude 
with on the need to be able to counter hypersecuritization and technification remains the key 
issue here - we need also to examine what questions and concerns are sidelined in the zones 
of technification. What we have found talking to cybersecurity professionals working in a 
variety of organizations is that many would see an importance in the questions and concerns 
of each perspective; we heard one expert say that they felt like a catastrophist working in 
organization x and an optimist working in organization y. One cyber ‘expert’ from the 
military world remarked to us that ‘in cyber the one eyed man is king.’ In 2017, for example, 
it was reported that National Health Service (NHS) Trusts were left vulnerable to 
Ransomware attacks in May of that year because cyber-security recommendations were not 
followed (Cellan-Jones, 2017). While these events may not be described as ‘catastrophic’ 
(6,900 appointments were cancelled) the question is clearly about future catastrophic events 
and the organised irresponsibility that may neglect or ignore certain vulnerabilities: in the 
organisations that are shaping the future elements in the security and military apparatus there 
may be failures of imagination on future threats or the digital disasters (or ‘integral 
accidents’) that may emerge from the environments that are being designed.  
 
The problem of technification is not simply on how it might add legitimacy to 
hypersecuritization, in what it enables us to visualize in the imagination of digital disaster – it 
is what it fails to see or ignores. This risk might intensify in a time when a variety of actors 
are shaping the digital worlds we inhabit. Or put another way: we need to assess the 
possibility is that there is a problem of ‘desecuritization’ in the zones of technification: we 
need to consider the possibility that organizations that play important roles in all areas and 
elements in security and war might fail to examine vulnerabilities in the race for efficiency, 
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speed and cost-effectiveness. On this view, we need to examine how cyber securitizations 
move from the political into the technified but also how issues and concerns can be erased – 
or desecuritized – through the dominance of a particular group or mindset inside the zones of 
technification. These concerns may be overstated – maybe ‘organized irresponsibility’ is an 
ungrounded fear- but these are questions that require attention. 
But another trend is clearer now than it perhaps was in 2009. Thinking about the various 
problems/levels of cybersecurity – from the everyday and individual, the critical 
infrastructures of national security, the corporate and economic – in the context of 
securitization and the ‘non-West’ raises a number of issues. Securitization theory – and 
poststructuralist work in global politics – is interested in how ‘otherness’ and ‘difference’ 
circulate in  (and are fundamental to) broader discourses of geopolitics and international 
relations; in this sense, discourses of cybersecurity – and the positions outlined in this essay – 
contain various types of digital danger emerging from the ‘non-West’: terrorists using the 
internet for radicalisation, devious hackers from North Korea, hi-tech techniques of 
surveillance in China. But thinking about cybersecurity issues in terms of traditional 
geopolitical categories – developed/ developing, and so on – begins to look problematic in a 
world where all territories are being transformed by new technologies and where the sources 
of vulnerability become deterritorialized: threats can come from a ‘problematic’ zone of 
global politics but it might also come from a bedroom in the same town in your ‘safe 
European home.’ Innovations in technologies (and new uses of existing technologies) might 
continue to emerge from California and Silicon Valley – but they might also emerge in states 
anywhere around the planet. 
Securitization theory warns us to be careful about the ways in which otherness can be drawn 
into broader geopolitical discourses of danger and difference.  But what it can also alert us to 
is the tendency to write over the complexity and messiness of events and developments in 
global politics with visions of security and geopolitics that ignore the specific and particular 
characteristics of the worlds that are being researched and written about (see Hansen 2006). 
Hansen and Nissenbaum’s essay is a call to explore the complexity of cyber, to think more 
critically about what constitutes a catastrophe or digital disaster and the different problems 
that can be absorbed into the discourses of hypersecuritized threat. But what is clearer now is 
the need to explore the complexity of cybersecurity in different geopolitical and economic 
contexts around the planet, to become  granular in our analyses, to explore the possibility 
that – while many cyber events emerge from the entangled, interconnected nature of events in 
the Twenty First Century – there may also be new trends and developments in the ways that 
new technologies are used (and abused) in different contexts, to examine the new everyday 
security practices that might be experimented with in different states, to examine the specific 
vulnerabilities that might be emerging for individuals and communities in different places 
around the world. From the conflict over bloggers in Bangladesh, to the everyday security 
practices that Chinese citizens live with, to new types of crime in sub-Saharan African states, 
to the use of new technologies by Mexican drug cartels, new research on the global poltics of 
cybersecurity needs to examine the local complexities and challenges faced not simply by 
states and corporations (the standard, ‘official’ approach to cybersecurity) but also by 
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individuals and communities (the move that securitization theory prompts us to take), 
examining the tactics of states and non-state actors using digital strategies and techniques. 
The three positions outlined here can begin to open research questions to begin to examine 
the glocal contexts of cybersecurity and the various issues and challenges of securitization: 
The Catastrophist: here the problems is to examine the potential for accidents and 
vulnerabilities (and what Rid would see as sabotage) – ranging from the relatively local 
and manageable to the more national and potentially catastrophic – that might emerge 
from the particular legal, political, economic and technological context; to examine the 
political and legal processes of technification that securitize issues or leave them in the 
realm of organised irresponsibility; to explore new types of crime that are possible due 
to trends in economy and technology (such as problems with ‘mobile money’ in states 
like Ghana or Nigeria, or new techniques of political and economic corruption). 
The Techno Optimist: the problem is to explore the legal and political pressures that are 
attempting to shape the digital lives of citizens; to examine the techniques that might be 
used against the ‘internal’ others  through new technologies of surveillance or 
abuse/harm; to examine how violence and conflict is being transformed through new 
technologies (see, for example, Narrain, 2017); to examine emerging tactics and trends 
that may be ‘globalised’ as useful techniques by states seeking to manage what they see 
as a the problematic digital ‘mob’; or to examine new techniques of subversion that set 
out to shape the political landscape; and to explore the new possibilities for conflict 
prevention and resolution. 
The Digital Realist: the challenge is to see how militaries around the planet – even the 
military forces that would be viewed as relatively ‘undeveloped’ and minor – are 
envisaging the use of new digital techniques technologies; to examine how they are 
dealing with the problems that - while not potentially ‘catastrophic’ – may result in 
operational and organisational problems (espionage, subversion minor accidents or 
sabotage that may impact the functioning of an organisation).  
So we need to remain open to what is happening in the digital lives of others, to the new 
vulnerabilities they confront, to the new forms of control that are deployed against them, to 
examine the trends in territories that might get ignored in our (imaginary) maps of digital 
geopolitics.  But in the process of ‘globalising’ these research questions, we should not lose 
sight of the need to think about the organised irresponsibility that we might find in the 
organisations and institutions that pride themselves as being the most ‘advanced,’ ‘rational’ 
and ‘cutting edge.’ 
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